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ABSTRACT 
 
Perhaps more than any other minority group in Europe, the Roma have tried to reach beyond 
the boundaries of the national state to change local realities of socio-economic 
marginalization and poverty. Roma activists have counted on the support of transnational 
advocacy networks and EU institutions to turn around the negligent attitudes of local and 
national governments. They have also tried to use the institutional and public spaces that have 
opened up for minority consultation at the European level. The further development of an EU 
framework that stimulates national states to design and implement new social policies that 
protect and support Roma is no doubt necessary, but it may not be enough. In order to have 
real impact on the ground, the EU will also have to address key obstacles in the field of social 
policy and human rights protection more broadly.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Minority populations in Central and Eastern Europe often face challenges of socio-economic 
and political exclusion, even if they are formally included in a state as national citizens. One 
response to this problem has been the establishment of separate institutions where minority 
representatives can critically engage with policymakers. The underlying idea is that such 
special channels for consultation and collaboration are needed to compensate for the lack of 
leverage minorities have through regular political participation. But is the increased presence 
of minority citizens in policy-making institutions sufficient to improve conditions for 
minority members in society more broadly?  
The question is particularly relevant for the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, a 
population that overwhelmingly belongs to the stratum of Europe’s socio-economically most 
vulnerable citizens and suffers from rising hatred (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2012, 
80-81; Rubin et al. 2014, Stewart 2012).1 The usual mechanisms of political participation 
have clearly left the Roma underrepresented. Even in the countries with the highest average 
estimated Roma populations in Central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria (9.94 per cent of the 
population), Slovakia (9.2 per cent), Romania (8.63 per cent), and Hungary (7.49) (figures 
from the Council of Europe 2012) – the number of elected politicians on local or national 
level who come from a Roma background, or have lived in a Roma community, is extremely 
low. National and local electoral campaigns by Roma activists have resulted in some small 
                                                
1 In this article I define Roma activism as any activity directed toward policy actors in the name of the Roma 
(and therefore in the name of any population that is broadly considered to be included under that label) and 
seeks to improve the socio-economic and/or political situation of this population. I fully realize that this means I 
am using the term “Roma” primarily as a political label – one promoted by many but not all activists – and not 
as a term to indicate ethnic or cultural belonging or affiliation; the name has been introduced to tackle the 
problems associated with other designations, which often carry derogatory connotations (e.g. “Gypsies”) 
(Stewart 2013). Among scholars and activists alike, such deliberate political usage of the term Roma is not 
uncontroversial (see e.g. Stewart 2010, Gheorghe 1991, Matras 2012), but nevertheless widespread. 
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victories, especially at the local level, but the overall ethnic electoral representation of Roma 
is negligible, both in ethnic parties and in mainstream political parties (Barany 2001, National 
Democratic Institute 2009, Degro 2015, McGarry 2009). Mainstream political parties, local 
or national administrations, and governing bodies seldom have Roma members. Even if 
Roma organize activist groups on an ethnic basis, or, as happens in some countries, are 
allowed to elect ethnic minority representatives – in Romania, e.g., through reserved seats in 
parliament, or in Hungary through a system of local and national minority ‘self-governments’ 
responsible for some matters of cultural policy – their influence remains limited and their 
voice is usually on the margins, even in debates on policies that affect them. 
 Over the last two decades many Roma activists have tried to strengthen their local and 
national position by joining forces across national borders (Ram 2010, Vermeersch 2005), a 
practice that finds precedent in earlier traditions of transnational Roma activism in the 1970s 
and 1980s (see, e.g. the International Romani Union (IRU) (Klímová-Alexander 2005)). This 
emerging transnational movement has put high hopes on support from several Europe-wide 
structures and agencies, including the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and mainly the EU. In a way, the EU became for the Roma 
the most self-evident post-national avenue towards minority activism and “claims-making” 
(Koopmans et al. 2005). And the EU has indeed more or less accepted this role. Recent years 
have seen the establishment of various EU mechanisms that encourage EU member states to 
introduce better policies to improve the position of “their” Roma and ensure that Roma 
themselves become part of a conversation with national governments and local policy 
makers.  
Can these EU efforts led to any meaningful change on the ground? Do the current 
channels for minority consultation at the level of the EU meaningfully increase the 
involvement of Roma in national policy formation? And is it likely that such involvement 
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will help realize substantial socio-economic and political change in the countries where the 
situation of the Roma is the most problematic? 
I begin this paper with a section that outlines why the European integration process 
has become so important for the Roma. I focus on the role of the EU’s enlargement process 
and the EU’s social policy agenda. I also discuss the establishment of special consultative 
bodies for Roma at the level of the European Commission. The section that follows addresses 
the limits of the EU’s post-national route towards a better position for the Roma. I discuss 
one important context-related obstacle hindering the potential impact of the current EU 
framework on the advancement of national policies that help Roma: the diminishing 
mobilizing power of the cross-border human rights ideals in the EU. In the last section I 
examine the ways in which the EU can still matter for the Roma, despite some remaining key 
challenges.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FOR THE ROMA  
 
EU enlargement 
The EU would never have been as crucial for Roma activism as it is today without the 
enlargement process. The European Commission progress reports in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, which reviewed candidate countries in Central Europe against a set of membership 
conditions, often highlighted the position of the Roma. There was a lot of normative pressure 
on prospective EU members during that period, and in response to this leverage the candidate 
member states were sometimes quick to review, revise and strengthen some of their minority 
policies (Schimmelfennig 2010) or adopt international minority protection legislation such as 
the Council of Europe’s multilateral instruments devoted to the protection of national 
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minorities: the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 
 Yet the story of enlargement is not all positive for Roma. Policy responses and legal 
regulations often turned out to be more symbolic and rhetorical than substantive and 
effective. Moreover, while some ongoing domestic reforms in the field of minority protection 
were no doubt given extra impetus by the EU’s membership conditionality and enlargement 
funding schemes, these reforms and legal adaptations often did not lead to any noticeable 
positive changes for Roma communities on the ground. Sometimes the developments were 
even negative – several communities became poorer and more socially excluded than before 
1989 (Guy 2001).  
This uneven result may in part have been inevitable given the EU’s strategy of setting 
broad preconditions for all candidate member states before entering into more specific 
negotiations with each of the states separately. As Grabbe has argued, the EU did not have 
equal traction in all candidate states; there was more influence and leverage in places where 
EU demands were congruent with domestic priorities and where there was already a “national 
project” in place to “return to Europe” (Grabbe 2014). In addition, there remained general 
problems of implementation and backlash within the framework of the conditionality policy, 
especially in the field of human rights. Vague requirements and flexible membership 
preconditions provided ample maneuvering room to states that were criticized by the 
European Commission for failing to protect or to improve the situation of marginalized 
Roma. In some cases, politicians used the conditionality pretext to begin or continue to 
mobilize against the Roma. Among Roma activists there was a high level of uncertainty 
about whether the EU could really push states to pursue radical policy changes on this issue 
and many realized that the EU’s enlargement policies could only go so far in helping to 
change socio-economic realities (Nicolae 2012). 
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The EU’s social policy agenda  
 
The situation of the Roma not only rose to prominence because of the enlargement process; 
there was also some attention from EU institutions because the EU, over the last two decades, 
has tried to promote the active inclusion of vulnerable citizens in governance structures (see, 
e.g. Daly 2008, Bee and Guerrina 2014) and create more meaningful forms of European 
citizenship, also for minorities (Isin and Saward 2013). In the field of social policy in general, 
for example, we see the roots of such efforts in the early 2000s in the context of the social 
Open Method of Coordination, a process of voluntary cooperation between member states 
geared toward reaching common goals in social affairs (Frazer 2010). Since then, European 
policy-makers have used and promoted various participatory techniques to communicate and 
collaborate with secondary stakeholders, i.e. organized networks or NGOs such as 
FEANTSA (the European Federation of National Organizations working with the Homeless) 
or EAPN (the European Anti-Poverty Network) and to a lesser extent, with so-called primary 
stakeholders, i.e. selected people from the target group. In the latter case, for example, people 
experiencing poverty themselves have been involved in consultative conferences, deliberative 
events and participatory processes. Such initiatives have fulfilled some important goals – they 
have kept social issues, including the position of vulnerable minorities, on the EU agenda and 
they have provided opportunities for policy exchange and learning (Frazer 2010, 20-21).  
But here too, the story is not all positive. As the 2014 mid-term review of the EU’s 
jobs and growth strategy “Europe 2020” has revealed, such efforts have not been able to 
create expected substantial progress. Policy initiatives have mostly addressed the preparatory 
phase or design of new social policies; implementation continues to be a problem (Frazer et 
al. 2014). Moreover, consultations (sometimes done online, see Quittkat 2011) and 
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participatory processes often encounter problems of transparency and representation (Lord 
and Pollak 2013). It remains unclear what outcomes consultation and participation should 
seek to achieve, how exactly a vulnerable group should be represented or a sufficiently 
diverse set of representatives can be included, and how tokenism or stigmatization can be 
avoided.  
 
Roma consultation mechanisms on the EU level 
In response to some of the disappointments associated with shortcomings of the EU 
enlargement policy and the social policy agenda, the EU has looked for new ways to prompt 
member state governments to take action on the issue of the Roma. Member state 
governments, for their part, have been increasingly interested in tackling the issue – even if 
only as a way to address (or in some cases avoid) intra-EU mobility of Roma (Nacu 2012). 
It is in this context that we have to understand the series of European Roma Summits 
that the European Commission organized in 2008, 2010 and 2014.  These highly visible 
meetings brought together a broad range of representatives from EU institutions, national 
governments, regional and local public authorities, and (Roma) civil society organizations, 
and were meant to provide a public forum for various stakeholders in order to increase 
general political awareness about the situation of Roma in the EU, especially among high-
level national policymakers. Some specific outcomes followed from this large-scale 
participatory effort. The first Roma Summit, for instance, concluded with the creation of the 
European Platform for Roma Inclusion, a smaller and more focused deliberative forum that, 
since 2010, has regularly facilitated meetings between state representatives, Roma activists 
and experts to identify promising developments and stimulate cooperation where needed. 
Among other things, these meetings worked out the basic principles guiding the European 
Commission’s action in this field. The EC tries to strike a balance between highlighting 
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national accountability and stimulating European monitoring, on the one hand, and 
advocating special measures to support Roma and propagating a mainstream approach, on the 
other. These meetings have also encouraged member state governments to provide 
quantifiable targets to reduce the employment and education gaps between Roma and other 
sections of the population, offer Roma access to micro-credit, or employ more Roma as 
qualified civil servants in the public sector.    
 The culmination point of this phase came in April 2011, when a Communication of 
the European Commission announced an overall European framework for demanding clear 
policy commitments on Roma from all EU member states (COM(2011) 173). Since then, 
member state governments have been urged to draw up “national Roma integration 
strategies” (NRISs). The logic here was that bringing such national policy plans together 
under the umbrella of a coordinated European effort would make it easier to compare 
national policy ideas, practices and commitments, and create new pathways toward more 
robust monitoring by independent agencies and civil society actors.  
 Since 2011, the European Commission has reviewed policy progress and examined 
more closely the ways in which member states have used (or failed to use) European 
Structural and Investment Funds for projects in which Roma are involved – all of this in 
order to ensure that the budgetary opportunities for Roma inclusion policies that come with 
European membership are not squandered. Through the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EARDF), relatively large budgets are now available for tackling various 
aspects of the situation facing the Roma, and conditions have been put into place in order to 
avoid such funds being used to segregate the Roma even further. In the case of the ERDF, for 
example, projects that are not explicitly aimed at desegregation – such as those that seek to 
improve housing conditions in a segregated area – will not be eligible for funding 
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(Vermeersch and Sobotka 2012). In response to such monitoring and reviewing efforts by the 
European Commission, several member states have revised their national strategies or action 
plans and set up consultation forums on the implementation of these plans. Expert reports and 
independent shadow monitoring by NGOs (e.g. Rorke 2012) try to push this development 
further. 
 
THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN POST-NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP FOR THE ROMA  
 
These European consultative efforts, which amount to a certain type of Europeanization for 
the Roma — i.e. they address the problems that appear in separate national contexts 
indirectly, by giving the Roma a European voice in a set of transnational institutions and 
initiatives — present both an opportunity and a challenge for Roma activists. The 
Europeanizing of policy demands and deliberations certainly has advantages over promoting 
policy ideas and discussions only locally or nationally. European awareness-raising 
campaigns can have more clout than local or national ones; individual, local, and national 
activists now find support from cross-border NGOs that are not only working on issues 
related to Roma, but are active in more broadly defined fields such as human rights and anti-
poverty, and on this basis, build new transnational European alliances. However, this must be 
weighed against the risks. For instance the European institutionalization of Roma policies and 
the actions on Roma issues by transnational human rights networks has led some politicians 
to reinforce the idea that Roma activism is by necessity a practice of “post-national 
citizenship” (Tambini 2010) – rather than one of national citizenship – and that Roma are 
therefore best served by EU institutions rather than national ones (Vermeersch 2012). Such a 
post-national conceptualization of a group’s identity should, in theory, perhaps not be entirely 
problematic (indeed, there have been calls to think in these terms about other social groups as 
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well) yet, in the absence of a substantial legal and political European citizenship regime it 
can, in practice, be used to frame the Roma as only European, and therefore not national or 
local. This informal status reifies the Roma as a group that is somehow separate from the 
national population of a state and does not share interests with so-called “regular” citizens of 
that state, who are still overwhelmingly viewed and defined on the basis of their national 
citizenship – they are, unlike the minority, not framed or understood as “European”. 
Moreover, the structures which are needed to improve the situation on the ground for the 
Roma (social welfare systems, redistribution mechanisms, and anti-discrimination policies) 
fall primarily under the authority of national states, not the European institutions (see, e.g. 
Schall 2012).  
 There are several ways in which the risk of the Europeanization of the Roma can be 
understood. One way is to consider the previously growing but now diminishing power of 
post-national and universal human rights standards as a basic framework for claiming rights 
across the borders of sovereign states in the EU. Activists who defend the interests of cross-
national minority populations and cross-national interest groups (e.g. LGBTIQ) have been 
able to benefit from the idea of such cross-border principles. But they are also the first to 
suffer from its diminishing traction in states that turn away from human rights ideals. In the 
case of the Roma, we see that states that were previously scrutinized for their human rights 
record by international monitoring agencies in the context of EU accession, now oppose such 
criticism more vigorously. The Hungarian government, for example, has rejected accusations 
that it has breached human rights laws and has instead endorsed new forms of exclusionary 
nationalism (Szikra 2014, Fox and Vermeersch 2010).  
The development of universal human rights standards within the EU should be seen as 
part of a larger global trend. Over the course of the 1990s, one could observe the importance 
of the normative idea that an individual state’s human rights record is of concern not only to 
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that individual state and its national citizens, but to the whole world, and that human rights 
protection is therefore enforceable across borders through “naming and shaming”. 
Throughout the 1990s it became clear that in this way, significant global wrongs could be 
identified, publicized, and in some cases, righted. This was in large part the work of 
international NGOs such as Open Society Foundations, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch (which, incidentally, were the organizations that managed to attract a lot of 
attention to the poor treatment of the Roma in the 1990s, when this was still an issue rather 
unknown to EU institutions). Such non-governmental international advocacy networks 
reinforced the global human rights agenda by moral consciousness-raising and by monitoring 
domestic change in individual states (Risse 1999). The human rights strategy, which gained 
influence in the wider world but certainly also in the EU, was based on the conviction that 
reporting human rights violations and publicly exposing human rights violators to a world 
increasingly convinced of the universal value of human rights, would lead to the emergence 
of a truly global human rights community. The optimism of cross-border non-governmental 
human rights advocates and their cross-border networks had an impact on the functioning of 
international governmental institutions. Clearly, human rights were something more than 
lofty ideals; they were adopted by governments and became part and parcel of hard 
international arrangements and judicial documents such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In Europe, the codification of human rights went hand in hand with the 
political and economic integration process. In 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force, the Charter of Fundamental rights, consistent with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, became legally binding for EU institutions as well as for (most) individual EU 
member states. Respect for human rights is now among the requirements for EU 
membership: through membership conditionality and external policy measures in the field of 
human rights, the EU attempts to be a “transformative power” (Grabbe 2006, Wetzel 2012). 
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And it may also work the other way around, from the bottom up: aspiring EU member states 
may rely on human rights norms to exert pressure on the EU. They may foreground their own 
human rights achievements to signal their legitimacy, sovereignty and readiness to become a 
member of the EU. 
 In recent years, however, several developments have put the human rights goal, and 
the associated “spiral effect” for influencing state behavior (Risse 1999, 18), under enormous 
pressure. This is illustrated by the emergence of a rhetoric and politics that emphasizes the 
safety of national citizens in the face of external violence from non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups, and the retreat of human rights concerns that has come with this (Luban 
2002, 10). In several ways, the slow retreat of human rights as a political ideal and the rise of 
alternative regimes of rightlessness have important implications for the Roma, even in states 
that adhere human rights conventions. In the field of territorial state governance, there are 
now various places and spaces where security concerns involving Roma populations eclipse 
human rights concerns. Many Roma have, for example, been the subject of collective ethnic 
expulsion campaigns within the EU, for example in France (Nacu 2012). Responding to riots 
after a police shooting in July 2010, then President Nicolas Sarkozy called an emergency 
ministerial meeting at which it was decided to shut down a large number of irregular Roma 
dwellings and single out Bulgarian and Romanian Roma for an expulsion campaign that 
would bring them back to their countries of origin, even if only temporary. France had been 
sending Romanian and Bulgarian citizens back home even before 2010. In 2009, the French 
government already deported about 9,000 Roma to Romania and Bulgaria, and also other 
Western European countries (Italy, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the United 
Kingdom) have for a number of years pursued targeted return campaigns (Vermeersch 2011). 
At the highly policed external borders of the EU, where practices of exclusion are visible 
through novel monitoring technologies and techniques, the category of citizenship is not one 
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of shared rights across borders but of exclusion, and this too directly affects Roma migrants. 
While the internal borders of the EU soften and disappear, the external borders harden; and 
while the equipment to protect those latter borders becomes more sophisticated, the concern 
for the human rights situation of those who seek to move across them diminishes. The media 
in these cases are often not an ally of the human rights organizations that criticize these new 
policies and practices. To be sure, the mistreatments do not go entirely unreported, but the 
media stories about Roma migrants often represent them in a less than favorable light. They 
are seen not as fellow human beings but as “objects to be controlled or as unwanted numbers 
or ‘flows’ of ‘illegals’” (Rygiel 2014, 62). 
 Furthermore, it has now become rewarding rather than costly for politicians to oppose 
external demands for human rights protection. In several countries, not least in the EU 
member states that were under close scrutiny for their treatment of minorities when they were 
still candidate states, external demands to respect human rights norms have come to serve as 
a foil against which nationalist aspirations can be articulated and legitimated. Such political 
dynamics bring the human rights spiral model to a halt. Reinforced political nationalism can 
create exclusions in a double way: it preemptively cancels out any external criticism on its 
human rights record, because that criticism is framed as an attack on the nation and hence as 
an argument for inward-looking national protection (the argument that “they” are against 
“us”); and it foregrounds the idea of ethnonational belonging as a basis for citizenship at the 
expense of cultural “others.” In such instances, the Roma are often framed as “others,” even 
in cases where they have been, in historical terms, part of the national population. This has 
clearly been the case in the rhetoric of the extreme right in Hungary, where Jobbik 
successfully thematized the issue of the Roma by relying on, reviving and constructing the 
notion of “Gypsy crime” (a previously discredited term that suggests a causal link between 
ethnic belonging and criminal behavior). According to Zsuzsanna Vidra and Jon Fox these 
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“racist discourses were not challenged by mainstream politicians, (…) but condoned by them. 
Indeed, in many respects, politicians from the governing center-right party but also to a lesser 
extent from the left opposition became complicit in the reproduction of these racist and 
racialized discourses on Roma issues” (2014, 437-438). 
 The formulation and framing of the “other” has real consequences in legitimizing 
strategies to expel ethnically defined groups of people from their home environment and 
create places of exception. Take, for example, the creation not only of particular “camps” of 
migrants of Roma background, but also of special zones of non-migrant Roma in countries 
where they are citizens – this has happened for example in Italy (Sigona 2005, Lippai 2011). 
 
HOW CAN THE EU STILL MATTER FOR THE ROMA? 
 
What we have seen in the last decade is thus a double development: on the one hand, an 
increasing number of channels for policy consultation around social inclusion have opened 
up through EU institutions, and on the other hand, the politics of minority claims-making in 
the EU has become a more complicated matter as backlashes against human rights abuses are 
increasingly hard to avoid. As a result, Roma activists often find themselves in double 
jeopardy – they may gain access to EU policy-making institutions and become stakeholders 
in the debate about social policy, but if they do so under the label of ethnic Roma (rather than 
in the name of a non-ethnic population) they run the risk of actively subscribing to an identity 
label that is widely seen as removed from the national (and nationalized) public arena. 
Furthermore, this label is associated with the ideals of transnational rights that served as a 
backbone for the democratization of CEE and the enlargement of the EU – ideals that are 
increasingly contested by nationalist and populist political movements. 
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How can the EU still matter for the Roma? A review of the literature on the evolving 
EU context and its impact on the position of minorities such as the Roma should lead to 
nuanced conclusions about the effect this process has had on the possibilities of activists to 
find real access to the policy-making process on national and European levels. Clearly, the 
European Commission has put a lot of effort into providing financial support for projects 
addressing issues related to Roma, through various types of funding schemes. This has given 
a strong incentive to (transnational) NGOs, resulting in increased activity on Roma issues and 
the rise to prominence of a number of transnational Roma activist organizations (Ram 2010). 
But from various reports and surveys, and from the June 2015 Communication of the 
European Commission, it is also clear that the post-enlargement period has so far not led to 
an overall larger role of Roma in government consultations on the national level 
(COM(2015)299). For this reason, the European Commission will start providing financial 
support for “the development of national platforms for Roma inclusion.” 
There is now an EU Framework for NRISs in place, which provides, a method for 
annual reporting of progress (or lack thereof) in the various member states; in theory, this is 
an important tool for shaming. In practice, however it is clear that the active involvement of 
the Roma communities themselves in social policy formation and implementation continues 
to be a weak point. The recent meetings of the European Platform for Roma Inclusion (the 9th 
meeting was held in March 2015) show that the Commission now highlights more than ever 
the importance of the involvement of Roma NGOs as active participants in the process of 
policy formation and implementation. Through such techniques as stakeholder engagement 
and participatory deliberation, the European Commission has included NGO representatives 
more directly in the policy conversation with EC administrators and politicians (in particular 
some MEPs) and also in the design of the European Platform meetings in the future.  
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How have Roma activists responded to this trend? One may distinguish at least four 
ways.  
First, they have organized to respond to opportunities directly linked to the 
participatory spaces established by the European Commission. Various activists have been 
keen to collaborate with EU administrators through the now-available consultative 
mechanisms. In preparation for the Platform meeting of March 2015, the Roma coordination 
Unit of Directorate-General Justice of the European Commission organized a small-scale 
brainstorm session with civil society representatives from Roma organizations, academics, 
representatives of networks of local authorities, and international organizations active on 
Roma inclusion (Working Meeting on the European Platform for Roma inclusion Brussels, 
25 November 2014). As the report of the meeting shows, the informal gathering concluded 
that the Platform meetings needed to be more reflective of the way it involved the various 
relevant actors, including Roma, in shaping European actions on Roma (Toft 2014). In 
essence, the message from that meeting to the European Commission was a request to turn 
the Platform into a truly consultative participatory forum where the voices of stakeholders 
can be heard, where opportunities to promote networking and sharing of expertise can be 
created, and where political commitments and accountability among participating politicians 
and policymakers can be fostered. 
Second, Roma activists have organized to respond more aptly to opportunities in the 
context of EU electoral politics. On several occasions, the European Parliament (EP) has 
debated the issue of the Roma in the presence of Roma activists. In 2013 it adopted the EU 
Framework for National Roma Integration Strategy 2020, a resolution acknowledging the 
progress made on the implementation of the national Roma integration strategies. Some 
political parties have brought Roma politicians to Brussels and Strasbourg as MEPs (in the 
current EP, this is the Swede Soraya Post and the Romanian Damian Drăghici). Moreover, 
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the EP itself (more precisely its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs) has 
requested studies on the subject (e.g. European Parliament 2011). It must be noted that the EP 
has also provided a floor for nationalist politicians with an anti-Roma agenda (Vermeersch 
2012).  
The third form of engagement by Roma activists has been in the field of developing 
and disseminating data on the situation of the Roma in EU member states. Roma 
organizations have increasingly attempted to become sources of reliable information and 
knowledge, sometimes in collaboration with international agencies (such as the UNDP, 
World Bank, or EU Agency for Fundamental Rights2), and existing or newly established 
(academic) research networks. Roma activists have sought to go a step further than simply 
collecting data; they have engaged in concerted efforts to bring fact sheets and progress 
reports to the attention of both policymakers and the media (see e.g., the publications of the 
European Roma and Travelers Forum, ERTF). As van Baar (2011, 265) writes, such 
information is “both productive and performative” and has the chance of making the situation 
of the Roma “visible as quantifiable ‘facts’.” In other words, the knowledge production based 
on a specific Roma perspective of the social situation at hand is itself a political strategy; one 
which goes beyond previous strategies of naming and shaming and is much more geared 
towards informing governments on how they can improve their policies.  
Fourth, Roma activists have increasingly felt the need to create and cultivate 
transnational advocacy networks. Since the EU Framework for NRISs has been in place, 
several NGOs have tried to develop more effective and comprehensive transnational 
advocacy networks with stronger links between various organizations (including non-Roma 
                                                
2 The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights has since multi-annual research program specifically devoted to the 
topic of the Roma. Collaboration with Roma themselves is part of the research effort in the form of 
“participatory action research, which means researchers will work in local communities, engaging directly with 
Roma and non-Roma, and local authorities” (http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2013/multi-annual-roma-
programme).		
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organizations). Some Roma NGOs work across national borders or have formed their own 
transnational collaborative networks, such as the European Grassroots Organizations 
Network (ERGO), the European Roma Policy Coalition (ERPC) and the European Roma and 
Traveler’s Forum (ERTF), or have become part of international government-supported 
arrangements such as the Decade for Roma Inclusion, which was a project that ran from 2005 
to 2015 and sought to monitor government commitments in the priority areas of education, 
employment, health, and housing while managing to secure direct collaboration with the 
governments of twelve countries (eight of which are current EU member states) in its 
activities. The most recent effort in the field of the promotion of Roma culture and creative 
arts has been the establishment of the European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture 
(ERIAC), a joint initiative of the Alliance for the European Roma Institute, the Council of 
Europe, and the Open Society Foundations. Some Roma activists have also become part of 
(or started working together with) more broadly-defined civil society networks such as the 
Open Society Foundations (see, OSF’s Roma Initiatives Office), or the European Foundation 
Center (Forum of Roma Inclusion). Although some of these initiatives have been set up 
outside of the context of the EU, they have indirectly relied on growing cooperation between 
EU member states and have been involved in, as they will likely be in the future, in 
consultation processes initiated by the EU. 
These four developments hold some promise, but a lot of what will happen to them is 
dependent on whether improvement can be reached on a number of broader issues that loom 
large. One is the persistently negative image of the Roma that informs even the most positive 
policy measures. While Roma citizens may have now all equal rights regarding education, 
welfare or political participation, it is not always possible for them to exercise those rights or 
secure access to particular entitlements. Increased political participation of Roma and 
pressure from Roma activism has certainly made politicians more aware of the need to 
  20 
implement measures that increase the possibilities for disadvantaged and marginalized 
populations to enjoy their rights, but deeply-rooted social patterns and political practices still 
continue to pose barriers. Once they are stigmatized and categorized as people outside the 
normal citizenry, Roma need strong advocates to promote their acceptance as citizens and 
their access to citizenship rights. Of course, in theory these barriers can be changed – one 
may recall Charles Tilly’s definition of categories as “not specific sets of people or 
unmistakable attributes, but standardized, movable social relations” (Tilly 1998, 66) – but so 
far this “moving” has not happened despite increased EU policy attention. See, for example, 
the continued practice in several EU member states of segregating Roma children in special 
schools or classes (see Rostas 2012), sometimes with the explicit explanation that this 
practice is done to “help” the Roma.3  
One can argue that inequalities between Roma and other social groups persist not only 
despite recent policy efforts to help the Roma but also, to a significant degree, because of 
these efforts. This is because they fail to address – and in some cases, even reinforce – the 
underlying view of Roma as an exceptional category. Measures that are aimed at saving the 
Roma from being “at risk” are implemented as part of a wider range of practices that mark 
Roma as a “risky group”. Such measures “fail to counter the essentializing categorization 
schemes that have produced earlier forms of categorized inequality” (van Baar and 
Vermeersch 2015, 13).  
                                                
3 In 2007, the Czech Republic was convicted for this type of discrimination in a landmark judgment (D.H. and 
Others v. the Czech Republic) of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), but since then matters have 
remained largely unchanged. In 2012, an ODIHR/OSCE field mission concluded that “the steps taken by the 
Czech Government have not ‘put an end’ to the practice the ECtHR ruled a violation of the Convention; Roma 
children are still overrepresented in segregated educational arrangements for children with special educational 
needs” (ODIHR 2012, 5). In 2015, the Council of Europe published findings from new research in the Czech 
Republic that showed that “Although the total number of pupils (Roma and non-Roma) in special schools or 
classes has dropped, year-on-year, from 17,755 in 2008 to 10,695 in 2014, the proportion of Roma pupils in 
such institutions increased from 28.2% (previous year) to 32.4% (school year 2014/2015)” (Council of Europe 
2015). 
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In addition, although most activists and organizations are strongly supportive of 
government institutions that demand policy attention for Roma issues across Europe, there 
are also rising concerns about the lack of political will to implement the policies, to foster 
real change on the ground, and to address discrimination and marginalization in ways that go 
beyond symbolic denouncements. The European Roma Policy Coalition, for example, has, 
while welcoming the EU’s Council Recommendation on effective Roma integration 
measures in EU member states, cautioned against rising levels of discrimination and lack of 
progress in Roma access to government institutions. The chair of the European Roma Policy 
Coalition (ERPC), Belén Sánchez-Rubio, stated in July 2013 that “So far, the EU Framework 
has not improved [the Roma’s] socio-economic situation nor visibly decreased anti-
Gypsyism” and has called for “the introduction of indicators for genuine Roma participation 
and empowerment” (ERPC 2013).  
EU policy makers have been fully aware of this challenge. Already in 2012, then 
European Commissioner Viviane Reding admitted that drawing up the national Roma 
integration strategies and sets of policy measures for Roma integration was “only the first 
step.” She added that “it remains to be seen how the strategies will be implemented. … I can 
say already that there is still a lot of room for improvement, in particular when it comes to 
securing sufficient funding for Roma inclusion and putting monitoring mechanisms in place” 
(Reding 2012). In October 2014, Věra Jourová, the European Commissioner on Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality, announced that the marginalization and exclusion of Roma 
would continue to be an important concern of the European Commission (Jourová 2014) as 
the goals were not reached.   
 
CONCLUSION 
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More than any other minority group in Europe that has been formally included in citizenship 
but has remained socio-economically marginalized, the Roma have tried to reach beyond the 
boundaries of national citizenship and have counted on the support of transnational advocacy 
networks and EU institutions to change realities on the ground. They have done so, in large 
part, in response to the institutional and public spaces that have opened up for minority 
consultation at the level of the EU. The latest developments seem to hold some promise. The 
European Commission has supported and stimulated the emergence of arrangements for 
Roma participation at the highest political level. Roma activists are now more organized 
within structures, networks and associations that allow them to be part of these increased 
consultative efforts. At the same time, however, such Europeanization leaves the Roma in an 
ambiguous position. Many Roma are faced with an inherent tension in the way European 
citizenship currently functions: it places them apart from national populations who, while in 
practice enjoy intra-EU mobility, still derive most of their citizenship rights from national 
membership. This is not unlike the situation of other marginalized subjects (Aradau et al. 
2010). Moreover, hate speech against Roma and anti-Roma political campaigning has risen, 
and hate crimes against them have soared, both in the home countries and in the countries 
where they have arrived as refugees or migrants. Although Romaphobia has a long history in 
Europe, in some countries Roma were never before more explicitly targeted as adversaries of 
the “national” population than today. 
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